Returning to the matter before us, it is not disputed that the petitioner is qualified to engage in teaching in accordance with the Education Ordinance; and there is no provision in that Ordinance by which his right to act as a teacher in a private school is made conditional upon the confirmation or consent of the Minister of Education or of the second respondent. This case is not concerned with a government school, or a school subsidised by the Government, in regard to which different considerations may perhaps apply. Nothing in the Ordinance suggests that there is a right in the Minister of Education or any other Minister to impose a restriction such as this, s 8(3) of the Education Ordinance is the only section which confers the right upon the Minister of Education to intervene in the question of employment of a teacher by an educational institution and to demand his dismissal; and even this section applies only if such teacher has been proved, as a result of a judicial enquiry, to be guilty of a criminal act or to have been engaged in incitement against the State.

    The question before us is not whether it would be a good or a bad thing if the petitioner were to be a teacher at the Montefiore School in Tel Aviv. The complaint of the petitioner is in fact confined to a prayer for an order directing the second respondent to cancel his objection to the employment by the third respondent of the petitioner as a teacher. Counsel for the petitioner rightly urged upon us that, before he need deal with the prayer, it was incumbent upon the Attorney-General to show on the basis of which law, or by what lega.l authority, a restriction has been imposed upon him, as upon all other teachers, preventing his appointment as a teacher in any institution, even a private institution, save with the consent of the Minister of Education. The learned Attorney-General was unable to direct our attention to any such law or authority.

    It is very possible that if a person “urges the use of arms against the Defence Army of Israel and against the Government of Israel” he should be disqualified from teaching in any school in the State. it is for the Knesset, however, to express its opinion on the matter, and should it decide that such a disqualification should be introduced, it will also direct by what method it is to be determined whether a particular person has in fact urged the use of force, and who is authorised to make such a finding.

2. It is quite possible that a person who approaches us with a complaint against the authorities that they have placed obstacles in his path in connection with his employment as a teacher, will not obtain the relief which he seeks if it is shown that lie urges the use of violence against the Defence Army of Israel and against the Government of Israel, because the granting of relief by this court in cases of that kind is a matter within its discretion. The only material before us, however, on this point, is the letter of the Minister of Defence to the petitioner in which he makes this charge against him, and the reaction of the petitioner is to be found in paragraph 18 of his affidavit in which he says: “more particularly as the allegations contained in annexure E are not based on fact”. I am, moreover, of the opinion that it is of far greater benefit to the community that the principle of “the rule of law” should be strictly maintained in this case than that we should refuse to accede to the application of the petitioner because of the suspicion that he urges the use of violence against the army. If, after all, this suspicion is well-founded, the petitioner is guilty of a criminal offence and the authorities are free to deal with him as with any other offender.

3. The learned Attorney-General attempted to present this case as one of the utmost simplicity. With the consent of the petitioner, he submitted, a condition was introduced into the contract between him and the third respondent that his acceptance as a teacher in the school would be dependent upon the consent of the Ministry of Education. Because of this condition the second respondent was requested to furnish the consent required, that is to say, to express his opinion. In reply to this request the second respondent furnished to the third respondent the opinion of the Minister of Defence that the petitioner was unsuitable to act as a teacher. Even if this should be interpreted as a refusal to give the confirmation requested, the Attorney-General submitted that it involves no unlawful act or one in excess of authority.

    Were it possible to regard the contract between the petitioner and the third respondent as the starting point of this affair, I would not hesitate to recognise the correctness of the submission of the learned Attorney-General. This argument, however, overlooks the contents of paragraph S of the petitioner’s affidavit, that is to say, that the condition referred to was introduced into the contract by the third respondent “pursuant to instructions”. Some support for this allegation is to be found in paragraph I of the second respondent’s affidavit in which it is said that in the circular which he sent to the principals of secondary schools in the country in 1950 he, the second respondent, requested them “not to employ teachers in their schools save after the receipt of the consent of the Inspector of Secondary Schools.”

4. It is clear that the condition referred to was introduced into the contract because of the circular which was sent by the second respondent to the principals of schools. That this is so I conclude from what is said in paragraph 8 of the petitioner’s affidavit which was not specifically denied by the second respondent, but who did not admit it because he had no knowledge of it (see paragraph c(2) of his affidavit). The second respondent did not annex to his affidavit the circular which he sent and we cannot examine the language of the “request” which is included in the circular with a view to ascertaining whether it is time language of a mere request, or an instruction which has the form of a request. For the words “you are requested” may sometimes be interpreted as “you are required”. The second respondent was also not summoned for cross-examination on his affidavit.

    This is important, for I would not think it possible to hay down a general principle that a Government Ministry is prohibited from addressing requests to the public or to particular institutions unless specific authority therefor exists in the law.

    I have no doubt that if the meaning of the circular referred to is to instruct owners of private schools not to accept teachers without the authority of the Ministry of Education, it was issued without authority, lacks all legal validity, and is of no binding force.

    Even if we regard the circular, however, as a simple request, I cannot escape the conclusion that in the particular case before us the sending of the circular constituted an interference in the internal affairs of the teaching profession, or a portion of it, without lawful authority. There is no doubt that in sending the circular the second respondent had reason to believe or to expect that the principals of schools would accede to his request. As a result, a new situation was created for the teaching profession or a portion of it. It is not sufficient that teachers possess the qualifications required according to the Education Ordinance, but there is now an additional condition — the confirmation of the Ministry of Education. Not only this, but the Ministry of Education has also failed to set up some body to which a teacher may turn nad defend himself against a refusal of the Ministry to confirm his appointment as a teacher. We have not been told that the matters to be taken into account in giving the confirmation were set out in the circular. It follows that the second respondent arrogated to himself the power of preventing the appointment of teachers by his own fiat, without any right of redress. We do not doubt the good intentions of the second respondent and that he did not issue the circular with the object of exercising authority. Such a circular, however, cannot afford authority for discriminating against a teacher or limiting his rights, in the absence of legal power to do so. Had the condition relating to the giving of authority by the Ministry of Education been introduced on the initiative of the principal of the school, we should not have been able to interfere. Since, however, the necessity for this consent was created on the initiative of the Ministry of Education, we must decide that it was issued without authority.